









It’s a genuine pleasure to be with you today. to
discuss a few of the major problems that are con-
fronting us at present in, the conduct of monetary
policy. I’m well aware that a discussion of a con-
tentious topic like monetary policy may be somewhat
out of keeping with the rather idyllic setting of this
convention. At the same time, this secluded spot,
well removed from the hectic pace of everyday busi-
ness life, may well be an appropriate setting for a
brief consideration of some of the broader, longer run
issues with which we’re grappling at the Fed, as
distinct from the immediate problems that receive so
much attention in the press. While I plan to mention
some of our present difficulties in passing, I want to
focus more specifically on some of these broader
issues this morning.
The Present Setting
On the surface, I suppose one could argue that the
immediate economic picture is pretty bright. After
all, we are presently in the sixth quarter of a vigorous
economic recovery. The early stages of the upswing
were powered by strong increases in both residential
construction and consumer spending. These sectors
are still reasonably buoyant, and they are now being
supplemented by increased business spending on new
plant and equipment and on inventories. The main
drag on the recovery to date has been the record
deficit in our merchandise trade balance, but even
with this deficit real growth in the economy has pro-
ceeded at an average annual rate of 6.7 percent since
the recession bottomed out in late 1982: Further, and
probably best of all, during the last two years we’ve
enjoyed the lowest sustained rate of, inflation since
the early 1970s. Indeed, my instincts tell me that
this apparent progress on the inflation front is one of
the reasons the recovery in business activity has been
so much stronger than almost anyone expected it to
be a year or so ago.
Despite this rather favorable scenario, I’m sure I
don’t have to tell you or any other knowledgeable
observers that all is not well. Since the beginning of
this year, there has been a growing uneasiness in the
business and financial communities. Especially in
recent weeks, expectations appear to have taken a
distinct turn for the worse. There are a number of
contributing factors. The discouraging failure of
Congress to come to grips with the problem of the
Federal deficit is a key element in the backdrop.
Against that backdrop the very strength of the eco-
nomic advance itself becomes something of a problem,
generating as it does large increases in private credit
demands and fears of a collision between private, and
government, demands that could put sharp upward
pressure on interest rates. The potential implications
of such a collision for the international debt situation,
for the stability of the banking industry and the inter-
national financial system, and for the beleaguered
domestic thrift industry have become a matter of
increasing concern to the financial community in
recent weeks.
But most serious of all, I think, is an apparent
escalation of inflationary expectations with all its
adverse effects on financial markets. Such an expec-
tations pattern tells us that public confidence in our
ability to cope with our problems without causing a
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observers of financial markets know, as we in the
Fed know, that inflation is not a solution. Indeed it
can be a source of only more vexing, more serious
problems that could cripple our financial markets.
Nevertheless, there appears to exist an undercurrent
of fear that political and other pressures generated in
this election year climate will be too strong for the
Fed to resist.
This troubles me greatly. After all, Chairman
Volcker and others of us in the System have said
repeatedly that the Fed attaches an extremely high
priority to sustaining and extending the recent prog-
ress in reducing inflation. And I think I’m correct
in my impression that most observers, despite critical
comments, believe that our intentions are firm and
honest. But despite our much heralded “independ-
ence,” many market professionals and others believe
it will be impossible for the Fed to resist strong elec-
tion year pressures to ease policy even at the risk of
reigniting inflation.
Public skepticism on this point can, perhaps, find
some support in past history, but I don’t think it cap-
tures the essence of the problem we at the Fed face
in trying to design and implement an effective anti-
inflationary program. The real problem, as I see it,
is not the limitations of the System’s ability to with-
stand partisan pressure or the ability of any of its
high officials to withstand such pressures. None of
us who choose central banking as a career expect to
win popularity contests. Rather the difficulty is the
nature of the mandate that has been given to the Fed
by the public through its elected representatives. I
have great respect for the collective wisdom of the
American people, but I have to acknowledge that I
do not believe the public has acted particularly wisely
or carefully in setting objectives for the Fed. I’d like
to spend the remainder of my time embellishing this
theme just a little bit. And in doing so I want to
emphasize that all of these views are my own personal
judgments. They do not necessarily reflect the views
of anyone else in the System.
What is the Fed’s Mandate?
Suppose I were to ask you: What is the Fed’s
mandate in the area of monetary policy? That is,
exactly what is it that the public expects the Fed to
do with monetary policy? I’ll bet that if I went
around this room and put that question to each of
you individually, I would get a wide variety of
answers. Some would probably say our principal
task is to hold inflation down. But others would
say it is to keep the level of real business activity
and employment high, or to prevent interest rates
from rising too much, or to keep the dollar from
becoming either too weak or too strong in the foreign
exchange markets, and so forth. Who would be
right? Well, in a sense, all of you would be right
because our mandate, in its present form, essentially
embraces all of these objectives. Section 2A of the
Federal Reserve Act, as amended, requires the Fed
“to promote effectively the goals of maximum em-
ployment, stable prices, and moderate long-term
interest rates.” Moreover, in carrying out monetary
policy, we are to "[take] account of past and pro-
spective developments in employment, unemployment,
production, investment, real income, productivity,
international trade and payments, and prices.”
You don’t have to be a genius to know that we at
the Fed do not possess the means to achieve all of
these objectives simultaneously and singlehandedly.
In other words, the Fed’s present mandate is unrealis-
tically general and sweeping, particularly if viewed
as a set of objectives to be achieved in the short run.
In practice, this has forced the Fed to choose among
competing objectives, or at least to make choices
regarding the weight to give any particular objective
in formulating monetary policy in the short run. At
first glance, this ability to choose among objectives
and to vary these choices over time might seem to
increase the Fed’s flexibility and hence its independ-
ence and its power. In my judgment, however, it
does just the opposite: it subjects the Fed to a re-
lentless barrage of pressure from competing interest
groups trying to badger the Fed into giving greater
weight to their respective points of view in setting
monetary policy. Since many of these groups can
argue with some justification that the Fed is man-
dated to achieve their favored objectives, such pres-
sures can, in our type of political system, paralyze
any effort of the Fed to set an attainable longer run
objective and stick to it.
I cannot emphasize this point too strongly. Far
from enhancing the Fed’s independence and insulat-
ing it from partisan pressures, it seems to me that the
lack of specificity in the Fed’s current mandate serves
to intensify these pressures, to reduce our real inde-
pendence, and to prevent us from achieving any par-
ticular objective as effectively and consistently as we
otherwise might. In particular, the flexibility we are
thought to possess almost inevitably leads us to give
substantial weight to current economic and financial
conditions in deciding on current policy actions. Cer-
tainly the System should be aware of the current state
of the economy and take account of any special prob-
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current conditions can lead to policy
actions that destabilize the economy
rather than stabilize it . . . .”
lems in financial markets in setting policy. But an
excessive preoccupation with current conditions can
lead to policy actions that destabilize the economy
rather than stabilize it because of the long and un-
predictable lags between the time policy actions are
taken and the point at which they affect particular
economic variables.
A Price Stability Mandate
If you’re willing to buy my argument that the all-
inclusive character of the Fed’s present mandate is a
problem, the obvious solution to the problem is for
the public to specify the objective of monetary policy
more narrowly and more precisely. That would mean
making a choice among competing objectives, and
obviously that choice would have to be made by the
public through the legislative process. If it’s not too
presumptuous, however, I would like to tell you what
by choice of an objective would be if the choice were
mine. My choice would be price stability, and what I
really have in mind here is a permanent return to a
very low rate of inflation. Indeed, I would go so far
as to set a goal of no inflation, after making allowance
for the effect of quality change and the like on mea-
sured inflation. Once the inflation genie gets out of
the bottle, it is very difficult to get it back in again.
You may reasonably ask why I would choose price
stability as the major objective of monetary policy
rather than some other desirable objective such. as
high employment or low interest rates. There are
several reasons. At one level, I would choose price
stability because I believe that inflation and the forces
that have created it are directly or indirectly respon-
sible for much of the deterioration in our nation’s
economic performance over the last 20 years or so.
Inflation disrupts the. functioning of our financial
markets and discourages saving and investment. It
introduces noise into market price signals. Its vola-
tility increases the risk associated with particular
business decisions and makes planning difficult. It
distorts incentives and leads to serious inefficiencies
in the allocation of resources. These distortions and
inefficiencies prevent us from achieving the advance-
ment in living standards we would otherwise be able
to attain.
But these points alone are not sufficient to warrant
choosing price stability as the prime objective of
monetary policy. Someone else could always argue,
with perhaps equal conviction, that high rates of
unemployment are even worse than high rates of
inflation, and that if it came to a choice between the
two, the Fed should give greater weight to reducing
unemployment. It would be very difficult-if not
impossible-to resolve this kind of debate. With this
in mind, I have a more fundamental reason for
choosing price stability as the principal and maybe
even the exclusive objective of monteary policy:
namely, that price stability is the only feasible objec-
tive for monetary policy.
“ . . . price stability is really the only
objective that it is feasible for the Fed to
try to achieve with monetary policy.”
This last point-that price stability is the only
feasible objective for Fed policy-is extremely im-
portant in my opinion, so let me just flesh it out very
briefly. There was a time not very long ago when
economists and others believed it was possible to
manage economic conditions very closely through
monetary and fiscal policy. The intellectual basis for
this belief was the famous Phillips Curve, which sug-
gested that there was a trade-off between inflation
and unemployment that could be exploited profitably
by policymakers. In essence, it was thought that
policymakers could choose any particular combina-
tion of inflation and unemployment along the Phillips
Curve. If they were willing to accept a little more
inflation, they could get a little less unemployment
and vice-versa. This approach to policy and the
confidence in the manipulative power of monetary
and fiscal policy it presupposed have come to be
known as “fine-tuning.”
Over the course of the last 20 years or so, this
view of policy and the Phillips Curve doctrine that
underlies it have been subjected to an intensely criti-
cal examination by a number of leading monetary
economists. In the course of this examination, several
important ideas have been developed that seriously
challenge the validity of the fine-tuning approach.
Let me just mention a couple of these ideas very
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their essence can be readily grasped by anyone.
The first is the so-called natural rate hypothesis.
What this says is that if there is in fact any trade-off
between inflation and unemployment, it is not be-
tween actual inflation and unemployment but between
that part of inflation that is unanticipated by the
public and unemployment. As long as inflation is
fully anticipated, the unemployment rate will fluctu-
ate around its natural rate as determined by such
basic economic factors as the characteristics of the
labor force and the state of technology. For example,
if an effort is made to stimulate employment through
policies that are likely to increase inflation, and if the
public in general and workers in particular foresee
this increase in inflation, workers will demand an
increase in wages to compensate for the expected
increase in inflation, and the policies won’t cause any
permanent increase in employment. The implication
of the natural rate hypothesis for policy, then, is that
employment can be systematically fine-tuned through
monetary and fiscal policy only if the public system-
atically and persistently misestimates the effects of
these policies on the rate of inflation.
“ . . . the natural rate idea says that you
can fine-tune the economy through fiscal
and monetary policy only if you can fool
most of the people most of the time, and
the rational expectations idea says you
can’t do that.”
The second idea is what is known as the rational
expectations hypothesis. In the present context, this
hypothesis holds that the public, as a whole, is intelli-
gent and perceptive and does not systematically mis-
estimate the inflationary impact of monetary and
fiscal policies. In short, the natural rate idea says
that you can fine-tune the economy through fiscal
and monetary policy only if you can fool most of the
people most of the time, and the rational expectations
idea says you can’t do that.
The implications of these ideas for ‘monetary policy
are both obvious and profound. In essence, they say
that the Fed cannot influence real economic condi-
tions like employment and production and real rates
of interest in any predictable way over time. This
leaves price stability as the only feasible objective for
monetary policy. I should point out that even though
the set of ideas I’ve just outlined and their implica-
tions for policy are not yet universally accepted, they
are embraced by a large and growing number of
economists, and I personally find them very per-
suasive. I might also note that they are not really
entirely new ideas but, like so many seemingly new
concepts, have roots in the classical economics that is
the foundation of our free market system.
The Matter of Implementation
I need to touch just briefly on one final point,
and that’s the matter of implementation. If one is
willing to embrace price stability as the main objec-
tive of Fed monetary policy, what’s the best way to
achieve it? In principle there are several ways that
we might go about it. For example, there have
been suggestions recently that the Fed might set
explicit numerical targets for the price level and
then react in some fairly mechanical way to devi-
ations of actual price movements from these targets.
There might be some advantages to this kind of
procedure, but I doubt seriously that it’s the best
approach given the very long and variable lags in the
effect of Fed policy on the price level.
More fundamentally, it is not at all clear to me
that some kind of reactive mechanism is necessary.
We all know that the one sure way for the Federal
Reserve to promote price stability is to reduce, slowly
but surely, the rate of growth of the nation’s money
supply to a steady noninflationary rate and keep it
there. With this in mind, my own feeling is that the
most effective way we could attain a price stability
objective would be to rededicate ourselves to the
monetary targeting procedure we already have in
place and to take some steps to strengthen that pro-
cedure. In particular, I think there’s much to be said
for the idea of setting targets not only for the current
year but for several years into the future. Multi-year
targeting would permit the Fed to put forward an
explicit longer run strategy for achieving price sta-
bility, and it would eliminate the technical problem
known as “base drift” that is an important defect
of the current one-year targeting procedure. (This
problem arises because we always base each new
year’s target on where we ended the preceding year,
even if we missed the preceding year’s target by a
substantial amount.)
Further, I think we need to focus specifically on
controlling over the long run the measure of the
money supply known as M1 and reduce the attention
we give to broader measures of money such as M2
and M3 and aggregate measures of credit. I am well
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nically oriented monetary specialists over whether or
not financial innovations like money market funds
and the ensuing deregulation in banking markets have
affected the demand for the various components of
M1 in an unpredictable way and therefore reduced its
usefulness as a target for monetary policy. The evi-
dence I’ve seen suggests to me that for now M1 is
still the best target among the various alternatives
available. I don’t think there is any serious reason to
doubt that a policy of gradually reducing M1 growth
to a noninflationary rate would allow us to achieve
price stability without any excessive risk to the real
economy. Having said this, let me also say that if it
becomes evident in the future that some monetary
measure other than M1 would be a better target for
policy, I wouldn’t hesitate to change. My preference
for the use of M1 as a target is entirely practical
rather than doctrinal.
". . . the Fed’s mandate, as it is presently
structured, is so broad and general that
its value as a practical guide to monetary
policy is limited and at times may actu-
ally prevent policy from contributing as
much to our economic welfare as it other-
wise might.”
Concluding Comments
I realize that I’ve covered a fair amount of ground
this morning, so let me just review very summarily
the main points I’ve tried to make. First, a case can
be made that the Fed’s mandate, as it is, presently
structured, is so broad and general that its value as a
practical guide to monetary policy is limited and at
times may actually prevent policy from contributing
as much to our economic welfare as it otherwise
might. Second, if the public should decide to narrow
the Fed’s mandate and make it more specific, the best
choice of a more limited objective for Fed policy in
my view would be price stability. Indeed, there are
very solid reasons to believe that price stability is
really the only objective that it is feasible for the Fed
to try to achieve with monetary policy. I might add
as a footnote here that restricting our mandate to
price stability should go some distance toward satis-
fying those of our critics who complain that the Fed
cannot be held accountable for its actions, since it
would not be unreasonable to hold the Fed account-
able, for the behavior of the price level over a period
of, several years. Nor should we in the Fed fear such
accountability since our assignment would be both
feasible and unambiguous. Third and last, if price
stability were our goal, my own feeling is that we
could best achieve it by slowly but surely reducing
the growth of M1 to a noninflationary. rate under
present circumstances, but I’m enough of a prag-
matist to have absolutely no objection to switching to
some other monetary handle if it is ever demonstrated
that something else has become superior to M1.
I hope you will find these comments useful as food
for thought. You in the banking industry are closer
to monetary policy than. people in most other indus-
tries, and we depend on you to consider these kinds
of questions carefully and critically and let us know
your views. I don’t claim that the changes I’ve out-
lined would solve all of our nation’s economic and
financial problems. Far from it. Some of these prob-
lems have very deep roots, and they Will not be re-
solved easily or quickly. Nonetheless, I am convinced
that the changes I have recommended would increase
our ability at the Fed to contribute to the strength
and stability of the economy. In a democracy like
ours, public institutions are guided ultimately by the
marching orders they receive from the electorate. If
we are to do our job well, it is essential that these
instructions be as clear and unambiguous as possible.
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